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Človekove pravice Paname - zgodovina

Človekove pravice Paname - zgodovina

Razmere v zaporih so ostale težke, predvsem zaradi prenatrpanosti, pomanjkanja zaporniških stražarjev, pomanjkanja ustreznih zdravstvenih storitev in neustreznih sanitarnih razmer. Zasebnih prostorov za pridržanje ni bilo.

Fizični pogoji: Od avgusta je zaporniški sistem s predvideno zmogljivostjo 14.167 zapornikov vseboval 16.114 zapornikov, kar je manj kot približno 17.000 zapornikov v letu 2016. Preiskovalni zaporniki so zaradi prostorske stiske delili celice s obsojenimi zaporniki. Razmere v zaporih za ženske so bile na splošno boljše kot za moške, vendar so pogoji za obe populaciji ostali slabi, saj so bile prenatrpane ustanove, slaba varnost zapornikov, slaba zdravstvena oskrba in pomanjkanje osnovnih potrebščin za osebno higieno. Starejši objekti v provincah Cocle in Veraguas niso imeli pitne vode ter ustreznega prezračevanja in razsvetljave. Zapornice so imele dostop do več programov rehabilitacije kot zaporniki.

V zaporih za odrasle so se zaporniki pritoževali zaradi omejenega časa zunaj celic in omejenega dostopa za družinske člane. Oblasti so priznale, da pomanjkanje osebja omejuje čas vadbe zapornikov v določenih dneh. Zaradi pomanjkanja zaporniških uradnikov so trpeli tudi mladoletniški centri za pridržanje in pripor.

En zapor, Punta Coco, je pod nadzorom Ministrstva za javno varnost in ne Nacionalnega direktorata za pokojninski sistem (DGSP) Ministrstva vlade. Marca je Medameriška komisija za človekove pravice (IACHR) ponovila zahtevo po zaprtju Punta Coco zaradi pomanjkanja ustrezne zdravstvene oskrbe zapornikov. Odvetniki in sorodniki zapornikov so morali do otoka prepotovati 66 milj z ladjo. Avgusta so oblasti 12 zapornikov začasno premestile iz objekta Punta Coco v zapor v Panama Cityju, medtem ko so ga nadgradili na mednarodne zaporniške standarde. Vlada ni nameravala trajno zapreti objekta.

Med letom je ministrstvo za zdravje izvajalo akcije cepljenja v večini zaporov. Zaporniki so prejeli cepiva proti tetanusu, davici, gripi, ošpicam, rdečkam in noricam. Hipertenzija, sladkorna bolezen, dermatitis, HIV/AIDS, tuberkuloza in bolezni dihal so bile še naprej najpogostejše bolezni zaporniškega prebivalstva.

Zdravstvena oskrba v zaporu na splošno ni bila ustrezna zaradi pomanjkanja osebja, prevoza in zdravstvenih sredstev. Avgusta je bilo v vseh zaporih po vsej državi zaposlenih le 55 zdravnikov (vključno z zdravniki, zobozdravniki, medicinskimi sestrami in tehničnim osebjem). Šestdeset odstotkov pritožb, ki jih je urad varuha človekovih pravic prejel od januarja do avgusta, se nanaša na pomanjkanje dostopa do zdravstvene oskrbe in zdravil. Uradniki so se pritoževali, da v centrih za pridržanje mladoletnikov primanjkuje zdravil, tudi potem, ko je ministrstvo za vlado ministrstvu za zdravje izplačalo velike zneske za njihovo nabavo. Oblasti so dovolile sorodnikom zapornikov, da prinesejo zdravila, čeprav so nekateri svojci plačali podkupnine zaporniškemu osebju, vključno s člani panamske nacionalne policije (PNP), da bi se izognili zahtevanim dovoljenjem. Oblasti so bolnike s hudimi boleznimi prenesle v javne klinike, vendar so bile težave pri urejanju prevoza zapornikov. Ker DGSP ni imel reševalnih vozil, so zapornike prevažali v policijskih vozilih ali v reševalnih vozilih za nujne primere, če so bili na voljo.

Avgusta je v priporu umrlo 10 zapornikov: štirje zaradi srčnega infarkta, dva zaradi virusa HIV, eden zaradi raka, eden zaradi tuberkuloze in eden zaradi kapi. En zapornik je umrl v zaporu zaradi nasilja nad zapornikom. Podatki o zdravstveni oskrbi v teh primerih niso bili na voljo.

Uprava: Zaporniki so lahko vložili pritožbe sodnim organom brez cenzure in zahtevali preiskavo verodostojnih obtožb o nečloveških razmerah, vendar oblasti rezultatov teh preiskav niso objavile. Urad varuha človekovih pravic se je v imenu zapornikov pogajal in peticiral ter prejemal pritožbe glede pogojev v zaporih. Urad varuha človekovih pravic je še naprej tedensko obiskoval zapor v zaporih v Panama Cityju in Colonu ter dvakrat letno v zapore drugod po državi. Vlada na splošno ni spremljala svojih sestankov z zaporniki.

Po vsej državi je bilo 1.264 zapornikov, od tega 207 novih. Uradniki DGSP so ocenili, da je sistem zahteval 1400 stražarjev, da so ustrezno zaprli zapor. Aprila so se vse mesečne plače za popravljalce zvišale s 460 USD in 690 USD na 800 USD (ena panamska balboa je po vrednosti enaka enemu ameriškemu dolarju).

Neodvisno spremljanje: Vlada je dovolila spremljanje zapora s strani neodvisnih nevladnih opazovalcev. Rimskokatoliška nevladna organizacija (NVO) Pravica in mir je med januarjem in julijem enkrat obiskala zapor. Nevladna organizacija je poročala o prenatrpanosti in koruptivnem ravnanju zaporniških uslužbencev, kar je vključevalo tihotapljeno orožje, cigarete in mobilne telefone za zapornike. Nevladne organizacije za človekove pravice, ki si želijo dostopa do zaporov v času obiska, morajo poslati pisno zahtevo DGSP 15 dni vnaprej.

Izboljšave: Po uvedbi novega akuzatornega kazenskega sistema in uvedbi zniževanja kazni septembra 2016 se je odraslo kaznilniško prebivalstvo med letom zmanjšalo s 17.000 na približno 16.000 zapornikov. Avgusta je bilo 247 zapornikom izrečenih znižanih kazni, 41 pa pogojnim odpustom. Zaradi precej podobnih razlogov se je število mladoletnih zapornikov v primerjavi s prejšnjim letom zmanjšalo za skoraj 50 odstotkov.

Septembra je DGSP začel izvajati zakon 42, ki zagotavlja poklicno pot civilnim zapornikom, tehnikom in upravnemu osebju. DGSP je odprl tudi nov upravni karierni direktorat in odprl nove prostore za svojo akademijo za popravljalce v osrednji provinci Cocle. 60-posteljno ambulanto zapora La Joyita so prenovili in bolje opremili, vendar je delovala z omejenim številom ur.


1968-1990: Vdor v Panamo in intervencija ZDA

Poročilo Noama Chomskega o ameriški invaziji na Panamo, njenem posredovanju v zadnjih dvajsetih letih in podpori diktatorja trgovine z mamili Manuela Noriege.

Panamo tradicionalno nadzira majhna evropska elita, manj kot 10% prebivalstva. To se je spremenilo leta 1968, ko je populistični general Omar Torrijos vodil državni udar, ki je črnim in meščanskim [mešanim rasam] revnim omogočil, da so pod njegovo vojaško diktaturo pridobili vsaj del moči.

Leta 1981 je Torrijos umrl v letalski nesreči. Do leta 1983 je bil učinkovit vladar Manuel Noriega, kriminalec, ki je bil kohorta Torrijosa in ameriških obveščevalnih služb.

Ameriška vlada je vedela, da je Noriega vpleten v trgovino z drogami vsaj od leta 1972, ko je Nixonova uprava razmišljala o njegovem atentatu. Vendar je ostal na plačilni listi Cie. Leta 1983 je odbor ameriškega senata zaključil, da je Panama glavno središče pranja sredstev za droge in trgovine z mamili.

Ameriška vlada je še naprej cenila Noriegine storitve. Maja 1986 je direktor agencije za boj proti drogam pohvalil Noriego za njeno "močno politiko boja proti trgovini z mamili". Leto kasneje je direktor "pozdravil naše tesno druženje" z Noriego, medtem ko je generalni državni tožilec Edwin Meese ustavil preiskavo ameriškega pravosodnega ministrstva o kriminalnih dejavnostih Noriege. Avgusta 1987 je resoluciji senata, ki je obsodil Noriego, nasprotoval Elliott Abrams, uradnik State Departmenta, zadolžen za politiko ZDA v Srednji Ameriki in Panami.

In vendar, ko je bil Noriega leta 1988 dokončno obtožen v Miamiju, so bile vse obtožbe, razen ene, povezane z dejavnostmi, ki so se dogajale pred letom 1984 - takrat, ko je bil naš fant, pomagal pri ameriški vojni proti Nikaragvi, ukradel volitve s privolitvijo ZDA in na splošno zadovoljivo služijo interesom ZDA. To ni imelo nič skupnega z nenadenim odkritjem, da je gangster in preprodajalec drog - to je bilo znano že od nekdaj.

Kot je pokazala študija po študiji, je vse precej predvidljivo. Brutalni tiran prestopi mejo od občudovanja vrednega prijatelja do "negativca" in "ološ", ko stori zločin neodvisnosti. Ena pogosta napaka je preseči ropanje revnih - kar je v redu - in začeti posegati v privilegirane in izzvati nasprotovanje voditeljev podjetij.

Do sredine osemdesetih let je bil Noriega kriv za te zločine. Med drugim se zdi, da se je vlekel, da bi pomagal ZDA v kontra vojni v Nikaragvi. Njegova neodvisnost je ogrozila tudi naše interese v Panamskem kanalu. 1. januarja 1990 naj bi večina uprave Kanala odšla v Panamo - leta 2000 naj bi v celoti prešla k njim. Morali smo se prepričati, da je Panama v rokah ljudi, ki jih lahko nadzorujemo pred tem datumom.

Ker Noriegi nismo mogli več zaupati, da bo izpolnil naše ponudbe, je moral iti. Washington je uvedel gospodarske sankcije, ki so tako rekoč uničile gospodarstvo, pri čemer je glavno breme padlo na revno večino belcev. Tudi Noriega so začeli sovražiti, nenazadnje tudi zato, ker je bil odgovoren za gospodarsko vojno (ki je bila nezakonita, če koga zanima), zaradi katere so njihovi otroci stradali.

Nato je bil poskus vojaškega udara, vendar neuspešen. Decembra 1989 so ZDA praznovale padec berlinskega zidu in konec hladne vojne z vdorom v Panamo, pri čemer so pobili na stotine ali morda na tisoče civilistov (nihče ne ve in le nekaj severno od Rio Grande je dovolj, da se pozanimajo) ). To je bogati beli eliti, ki jo je s pučem v Torrijosu izpodrinilo, povrnilo moč - ravno v času, da bi 1. januarja 1990 zagotovila skladno vlado za upravno prehod Kanala (kot je zapisal desničarski evropski tisk).

V tem procesu je ameriški tisk sledil Washingtonu in izbiral zlikovce glede na trenutne potrebe. Dejanja, ki smo jih prej odobrili, so postala zločini. Na primer, leta 1984 je na panamskih predsedniških volitvah zmagal Arnulfo Arias. Volie je ukradel Noriega, s precejšnjim nasiljem in goljufijo.

Toda Noriega še ni postal neposlušen. Bil je naš mož v Panami in veljalo je, da ima stranka Arias nevarne prvine "ultranacionalizma". Reaganova administracija je zato ploskala nasilju in goljufijam ter poslala državnega sekretarja Georgea Shultza, da legitimira ukradene volitve in pohvali Noriegino različico "demokracije" kot vzor za zgrešene nikaragvanske sandiniste.

Washington -medijsko zavezništvo in pomembnejše revije so se vzdržali kritiziranja goljufivih volitev, vendar so zavrnili svobodne in poštene volitve sandinistov v istem letu, ker jih ni bilo mogoče nadzorovati.

Maja 1989 je Noriega spet ukradel volitve, tokrat predstavniku poslovne opozicije Guillermu Endari. Noriega je uporabil manj nasilja kot leta 1984. Toda Reaganova uprava je dala signal, da se je obrnila proti Noriegi. Po predvidljivem scenariju je tisk izrazil ogorčenje nad tem, da ni izpolnil naših visokih demokratičnih standardov.

Tisk je začel tudi strastno obsojati kršitve človekovih pravic, ki prej niso dosegle praga njihove pozornosti. Ko smo decembra 1989 vdrli v Panamo, so mediji demonizirali Noriego in ga spremenili v najhujšo pošast od Atile Huna. (To je bila v bistvu ponovitev demonizacije Gadafija v Libiji.) Ted Koppel je govoril, da "Noriega spada v tisto posebno bratovščino mednarodnih zlikovcev, kot so Gadafi, Idi Amin in ajatolah Homeini, ki jih Američani radi sovražijo." Dan Rather ga je postavil "na vrh seznama svetovnih tatov drog in šljamov". Pravzaprav je Noriega ostal zelo manjši razbojnik - točno to, kar je bil, ko je bil na plačilni listi Cie.

Leta 1988 je na primer Americas Watch v Panami objavila poročilo o človekovih pravicah, ki je dalo neprijetno sliko. Ker pa njihova poročila - in druga poizvedovanja - jasno kažejo, Noriegini zapisi o človekovih pravicah niso bili nič manj podobni zapisom drugih ameriških strank v regiji in nič slabši kot v časih, ko je bil Noriega še vedno priljubljen po ukazih.

Vzemimo za primer Honduras. Čeprav to ni morilska teroristična država, kot sta El Salvador ali Gvatemala, so bile kršitve človekovih pravic tam verjetno hujše kot v Panami. Pravzaprav je v Hondurasu en bataljon, ki ga je usposobila CIA, ki je sam po sebi storil več grozodejstev kot Noriega.

Ali pa pomislite na diktatorje, ki jih podpirajo ZDA, kot so Trujillo v Dominikanski republiki, Somoza v Nikaragvi, Marcos na Filipinih, Duvalier na Haitiju in množica srednjeameriških gangsterjev v osemdesetih letih. Vsi so bili veliko bolj brutalni kot Noriega, vendar so jih ZDA navdušeno podpirale skozi desetletja grozljivih grozodejstev - dokler je dobiček tekel iz njihovih držav in v ZDA. Uprava Georgea Busha je med drugimi še naprej častila Mobutuja, Ceausescuja in Sadama Husseina, vse veliko slabše kriminalce kot Noriega. Suharto iz Indonezije, verjetno najhujši morilec vseh, ostaja "zmerni" v Washingtonu.

Pravzaprav je Bushova administracija točno v trenutku, ko je napadla Panamo zaradi ogorčenja nad Norieginimi zlorabami človekovih pravic, napovedala novo visokotehnološko prodajo na Kitajsko, pri čemer je ugotovila, da je v igri 300 milijonov dolarjev za ameriška podjetja in da so stiki na skrivaj se je nadaljevalo nekaj tednov po pokolu na trgu Tiananmen.

Isti dan - na dan napada na Panamo - je Bela hiša napovedala tudi načrte (in jih kmalu zatem uresničila) za odpravo prepovedi posojil Iraku. State Department je z odkritim obrazom pojasnil, da naj bi s tem dosegel "cilj povečanja ameriškega izvoza in nas postavil v boljši položaj, da se z Irakom spopademo glede njegovih zgodovin človekovih pravic".
Oddelek je nadaljeval s pozo, ko je Bush odvračal iraško demokratično opozicijo (bankirje, strokovnjake itd.) In blokiral prizadevanja kongresa, da bi obsodil grozljive zločine svojega starega prijatelja Sadama Huseina. V primerjavi z Bushovimi prijatelji v Bagdadu in Pekingu je bila Noriega videti kot mati Tereza.

Po invaziji je Bush napovedal milijardo dolarjev pomoči Panami. Od tega je bilo 400 milijonov dolarjev sestavljenih iz spodbud za ameriška podjetja pri izvozu izdelkov v Panamo, 150 milijonov dolarjev naj bi poplačalo bančna posojila, 65 milijonov dolarjev pa za posojila v zasebnem sektorju in garancije ameriškim vlagateljem. Z drugimi besedami, približno polovica pomoči je bila darilo ameriških davkoplačevalcev ameriškim podjetjem.

ZDA so po invaziji spet postavile bankirje na oblast. Noriega je bila vpletena v trgovino z mamili v primerjavi z njihovo. Tamkajšnjo trgovino z drogami so vedno izvajale predvsem banke - bančni sistem je tako rekoč neurejen, zato je to naravni izhod za kriminalni denar. To je bila podlaga za zelo umetno gospodarstvo Paname in tako - verjetno na višji ravni - ostaja tudi po invaziji. Panamske obrambne sile so bile obnovljene z v bistvu istimi častniki.

Na splošno je vse približno enako, šele zdaj so odgovorni bolj zanesljivi služabniki. Enako velja za Grenado, ki je od vdora v ZDA postala glavno središče pranja denarja za droge. Tudi Nikaragva je po zmagi Washingtona na volitvah leta 1990 postala pomemben prenos drog na ameriški trg. Vzorec je standardni - tako kot ga ne opazimo.)

Chomsky je seveda ameriški državljan, zato se »mi« in »naši« nanašata na ZDA. Članek je rahlo uredil libcom - črkovanje med ZDA in Združenim kraljestvom, za bralca, ki je nov na to temo, pa je bilo dodanih nekaj manjših podrobnosti.


Olajšanje

Panamo na severu omejuje Karibsko morje (podaljšek Atlantskega oceana), na jugu pa Tihi ocean. Ima podolgovato obliko S, s karibsko obalo, ki se razteza na približno 1.290 km, pacifiška obala pa na 1.700 km, vendar je črta od meje Kostarike na zahodu do kolumbijske meje na vzhodu. bi se raztezalo le na 480 milj (770 km). Najkrajša razdalja čez prevlako je približno 30 milj (50 km) od ustja reke Nergalá (Necategua), ki se izliva v zaliv San Blas na karibski obali, do izliva reke Chepo na pacifiški obali . Skoraj tako ozek je predel, ki ga prečka Panamski prekop.

Osrednja hrbtenica gorskih verig se razteza skoraj po celotni dolžini Paname in deli državo na pobočja, obrnjena proti Atlantiku in Pacifiku. Dva glavna območja, gore Tabasará (Cordillera Central) na zahodu in Cordillera de San Blas na vzhodu, sta v bližini središča države ločena s sedlom nižje zemlje. Ta depresija (območje Panamskega prekopa) državo spet deli - približno na zahodno in vzhodno polovico. Od štirih tako oblikovanih kvadrantov ima jugozahod največ naselij, vendar okolica kanala predstavlja večino prebivalstva in trgovine Paname. Najvišji vrh države je neaktiven vulkan Barú (Chiriquí), ki doseže nadmorsko višino 11.401 čevljev (3.475 metrov).

Vzporedno z glavnimi gorskimi verigami se vzdolž južne obale Paname razteza nižji gorski lok. Pojavlja se le v dobro ločenih segmentih-na primer na polotoku Azuero kot masiv Canajagua in v vzhodni Panami kot Sierra de Jungurudó, gorovje Sapo in gorovje Majé. Gorsko gorje in gore sestavljajo predvsem magmatske (vulkanske) kamnine.

Nižine vključujejo ravnice provinc Panamá in Chiriquí, ravnine in hribe province Colón, porečja rek Chepo in Chucunaque na vzhodu ter ozke severovzhodne ravnice Karibov. Sedimentne kamnine, kot so skrilavci in skrilavci, so podlaga za večino nižinskih območij.

Tihooceansko obalo razširijo polotok Azuero in Panamski zaliv ter številni rtovi in ​​zalivi, največji nasip na karibski strani pa je laguna Chiriquí. Pacifiška obala je bolj razčlenjena in nepravilna, njen celinski pas pa je veliko širši od tistega na atlantski strani. Poleg tega večina od več kot 1600 otokov republike leži ob njeni pacifiški obali, vključno z arhipelagom Perlas (Biserni otoki) in največjimi otoki Taboga, Cébaco, Parida, Jicarón in Coiba. Glavna arhipelaga ob karibski obali sta otoka Bocas del Toro in San Blas.


Panamski spisi: Novinarji in aktivisti obeležujejo 30 let od invazije ZDA

UWCHR je navdušen, da je del projekta Panama Files, multidisciplinarnega, večnacionalnega projekta, ki pomaga obnoviti zgodovinski spomin na ameriško invazijo leta 1989 na Panamo in nadaljnje cilje na področju človekovih pravic.

UWCHR že od zimskega četrtletja 2019 sodeluje s panamskim novinarskim kolektivom Concolón in vladno komisijo, imenovano, da prvič dokumentira žrtve invazije, ki danes obeležuje tridesetletnico. Naš del tega sodelovanja vključuje pridobivanje in analizo dokumentov ameriške vlade, ki osvetljujejo te pomisleke, ter njihovo izmenjavo z našimi partnerji v Panami. V začetku tega tedna je bila prva tranša teh dokumentov na voljo javnosti prek projekta Panama Files.

Kot sta v nedavnem članku v El Paisu komentirala Sol Lauria Paz in Eliezer Budasoff, je bila invazija ZDA že dolgo neprijetna tema v Panami, zato se je vrsta vlad izogibala vpletenju v to zgodovino, deloma zaradi želje, da se izognejo nasprotovanju Ameriška vlada s prikrivanjem invazije. K temu je pripomogla tudi stigmatizacija žrtev, ki so bile večinoma iz revnih afro-panamskih sosesk, kot je El Chorrillo v Panama Cityju, ki so ga ameriške sile zravnale. Število ubitih civilistov v invaziji ostaja neznano, ocene pa segajo od stotine do več kot tisoč.

Napad 20. decembra 1989 je bil namenjen odstranitvi diktatorja Manuela Noriege, nekdanjega zaveznika ZDA, ki je v času njegovega vladanja postajal vse bolj neusmiljen. "Operacija Just Cause" je vključevala 27.000 vojakov v velikem izkazovanju sile, z uporabo taktike, ki je napovedala prihodnje ameriške vojaške operacije, vključno z invazijami na Irak. Operacija je bila znana po svojem poudarku na nadzoru medijskih pripovedi z uporabo vdelanih poročil in skrbno pripravljenih pogovorov, kot je razvidno iz dokumentov Panamskih datotek. Obsežna dokumentacija ameriške vojske o invaziji in ohranitev nastalih zapisov je omembe vredna tudi v okviru tekočega dela za odkrivanje arhivov v zvezi z ameriškimi vojaškimi operacijami in pomočjo v Srednji Ameriki.

En estos momentos nos encontramos desclasificando y creando historias en base a los documentos que se encontraban en Estados Unidos. pic.twitter.com/RM9K3UnS8l

& mdash Concolón Panamá (@ConcolonPanama) 6. december 2019

V začetku tega meseca sta direktorica UWCHR Angelina Godoy in dodiplomska raziskovalka Maya Green odpotovali v Panamo, da bi delili dokumente s partnerskimi organizacijami in sodelovali pri Laboratorij Memoria, delavnica, ki jo je vodil Concolón, da bi novinarjem olajšal dostop in analizo ameriških dokumentov in jih analiziral. UWCHR bo to delo nadaljeval tudi v letu 2020, pri čemer si bo prizadeval za odstranitev tajnosti tisočih strani dokumentov, ki še niso na voljo, in jih delil z novinarji, zagovorniki človekovih pravic in znanstveno skupnostjo v Panami in širše. Obiščite spletno mesto Panama Files in si oglejte izbrane dokumente ter preberite poročila, večina v španščini, na podlagi datotek.

Poleg arhiva Panama Files so novinarji, avtorji in umetniki, povezani s Concolonom, izdali interaktivno spletno publikacijo Duelo, serijo podkastov, grafični roman in drugo gradivo v zvezi z invazijo leta 1989. Kolektivna kampanja družabnih omrežij ’s “#CuentaLaInvasión ” vabi tudi preživele Panamance, da delijo svoje zgodbe in spomine na invazijo.

Prispevki UWCHR pri projektu Panama Files temeljijo na naši zavezanosti “Dostop do informacij kot človekova pravica ” in naše izkušnje pri raziskovanju razkritih tajnih dokumentov ameriške vlade v El Salvadorju v partnerstvu s salvadorskimi organizacijami za človekove pravice in skupinami preživelih prek “ Nedokončane stavke ” projekt.

Center za človekove pravice, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Box 353650, Seattle, WA 98195-3650

Thomsonova dvorana | Telefon: (206) 685-3435 | Faks: (206) 685-0668 | Elektronski naslov: [email protected]

Povežite se z nami:

& kopiraj 2021 Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington | Seattle, WA


Mučenje in drugo kruto, nečloveško ali ponižujoče ravnanje ali kaznovanje

PANAMA Poročila o praksah človekovih pravic za leto 2016 Državno ministrstvo Združenih držav Amerike in biro za demokracijo, človekove pravice in delo Ustava prepoveduje takšno ravnanje in ni bilo poročil, da bi jih vladni uslužbenci zaposlovali. Pogoji v zaporih in centrih za pridržanje Razmere v zaporih so ostale težke predvsem zaradi prenatrpanosti, pomanjkanja zaporniških stražarjev, pomanjkanja ustreznih zdravstvenih storitev in neustreznih sanitarnih pogojev. Zasebnih prostorov za pridržanje ni bilo.

Fizične razmere: Od novembra je v zapornem sistemu s predvideno zmogljivostjo 14.174 zapornikov zaprtih 17.165 zapornikov. Zaporniki pred sojenjem so zaradi prostorske stiske delili celice z obsojenimi zaporniki.

Razmere v zaporih za ženske so bile na splošno boljše kot za moške, vendar so pogoji za obe populaciji ostali slabi, s prenatrpanimi prostori, slabo zdravstveno oskrbo in pomanjkanjem osnovnih potrebščin za osebno higieno. Nekateri starejši objekti niso imeli pitne vode in ustreznega prezračevanja.

Zaradi pomanjkanja zaporniških uradnikov so trpeli tudi mladoletniški centri za pridržanje in pripor. Po vsej državi je bilo 1.005 zapornikov, od tega 176 novih, ki so bili med letom najeti, kar je skoraj dvakrat več kot 547 stražarjev v letu 2010. Uradniki so ocenili, da sistem potrebuje 1400 stražarjev. V zaporih za odrasle so se zaporniki pritoževali zaradi omejenega časa zunaj celic in omejenega dostopa za družinske člane. Oblasti so priznale, da nezadostna pokritost agentov Nacionalne policije Paname (PNP) omejuje čas vadbe zapornikov v določenih dneh.

Marca so na pobudo Medameriške komisije za človekove pravice (IACHR) oblasti šest voditeljev tolp na visoki ravni, ki so jih pridržali v objektu Punta Coco na pacifiškem otoku, premestili v kompleks Gran Joya na celini, zapuščanje objekta prazno. Od otvoritve Punta Coco & rsquos leta 2015 so se nevladne organizacije za človekove pravice pritožile, da na otoku ni nobenega zdravnika, ki bi lahko zapornike prejemal le od edinega reševalca Nacionalne letalske službe. Septembra je predsednik Varela z utemeljitvijo javne varnosti odredil premestitev štirih visoko tveganih članov tolpe Chorrillo v Punta Coco, potem ko so poškodovali otroka. Odvetnik članov tolpe & rsquo je trdil, da slabi pogoji v pripornem centru, vključno z napadom komarjev, kršijo človekove pravice pridržanih. Konec novembra so jih premestili v celinski zapor, zaradi česar je bil objekt prazen, nato pa so jih do sojenja izpustili.

Urad varuha človekovih pravic & rsquos je poročal, da je glavna skrb zapornikov slaba ali neustrezna zdravstvena oskrba. Hipertenzija, sladkorna bolezen, dermatitis, HIV/AIDS, tuberkuloza in bolezni dihal so bile najpogostejše bolezni zaporniškega prebivalstva. Zaporna zdravstvena oskrba je bila pomanjkljiva zaradi pomanjkanja osebja, prevoza in zdravstvenih sredstev. Avgusta je bilo v vseh zaporih po vsej državi zaposlenih 73 zdravstvenih delavcev (39 zdravnikov in 34 medicinskih sester in tehničnega osebja). Oblasti so bolnike s hudimi boleznimi prenesle v javne klinike, vendar so bile težave pri organizaciji zapornikov in rsquo prevoza. V kaznilnem sistemu ni bilo reševalcev. Zapornike so prevažali v policijskih vozilih ali v reševalnih vozilih za nujne primere, če so bili na voljo. Od septembrskega zapora medicinskim enotam še naprej primanjkuje zdravil. Oblasti so dovolile sorodnikom zapornikov, da prinesejo zdravila, čeprav so nekateri svojci plačali podkupnine zaporniškemu osebju, vključno s člani PNP, da bi se izognili zahtevanim dovoljenjem. Oktobra je v priporu umrlo 25 zapornikov. Enaindvajset teh smrti je bilo posledica kroničnih bolezni, vključno s tuberkulozo in virusom HIV, vse razen dveh pa se je zgodilo po tem, ko so bili zaporniki premeščeni v zdravstveno ustanovo. Dodatni štirje posamezniki so umrli v zaporu zaradi nasilja nad zaporniki.

Zanikanje poštenega javnega sojenja, čeprav zakon predvideva neodvisno sodstvo, je bil pravosodni sistem neučinkovit in dovzeten za korupcijo in zunanji vpliv ter se je soočal z obtožbami o manipulacijah s strani izvršilne veje oblasti. Med letom je pravosodje najelo 931 odvetnikov, ki so v okviru novega obtožnega sistema kot javni zagovorniki, sodniki in sodniki, nevladna organizacija ProJustice Alliance in Državna odvetniška zbornica pa sta se pritožili, da vrhovno sodišče ne upošteva zakona 53 iz leta 2015, ki določa prakse zaposlovanja in napredovanja v sodstvu na podlagi zaslug. Poleg tega je nevladna organizacija trdila, da novim zaposlenim ni prišlo do neodvisnosti, saj so nekateri prej delali pri sedanjem vrhovnem sodniku Joseju Ayu Pradu. Vrhovno sodišče je 931 novih delavcev zaposlilo na & ldquo sodobni & rdquo podlagi domnevno zaradi premajhnega časa in proračuna za stalno zaposlene.

Spoštovanje državljanskih svoboščin, vključno z a. Svoboda govora in tiska Ustava predvideva svobodo govora in tiska. Nekateri novinarji so se pritoževali nad nadlegovanjem, ustrahovanjem in grožnjami, ko so poročali o zgodbah o neprimernosti, korupciji ali drugih zločinih, v katere so bili vključeni pripadniki ministrstva za javno varnost ali pripadniki sil za javno varnost. Tiskovne in medijske svoboščine: poročali so, da je vlada odvračala novinarje od pisanja zgodb, kritičnih do uprave. Po podatkih Zveze novinarjev & rsquo iz Paname je septembra Nacionalna šola novinarjev prejela 20 pritožb zaradi vladnega pritiska na medijske kritike. Vrhovno sodišče je potrdilo obsodbo o obrekovanju dveh novinarjev El Panama America, Jeana Marcela Cheryja in Gustava Aparicija, zaradi poročanja o gradnji zasebne ceste leta 2001 z zasebnimi sredstvi nekdanjega sodnika in ministra Winstona Spadafore. Sodišče je novinarjem naložilo, naj Spadafori plačajo 25.000 balboa (25.000 USD). Novinarska združenja in lokalni mediji so obsodili odločitev, ki ima zastrašujoč učinek na sposobnost medijev in spremljanja finančnih dejavnosti javnih uslužbencev.

Trinajsto civilno sodišče je dnevnemu dnevu La Prensa naložilo, naj bratom Davidu in Danielu Ochyju plača 600.000 balboa (600.000 USD) za primer iz leta 2012 zaradi & ldquomoralne škode. & Rdquo Objava La Prensa je poročala, da je ministrstvo za javna dela naklonjeno gradnji Ochys & rsquo podjetje, TRANSCARIBE Trading, s projekti vrednimi milijone dolarjev. Mediji, ki so jih med letom obvladovali politični in poslovni voditelji, ki so v postopku, so trdili, da ti postopki omejujejo njihovo svobodo izražanja. Mediji so še naprej prosto objavljali in oddajali vse leto.

Nasilje in nadlegovanje: Marca je novinarka Ana Sierra iz dnevnika Metro Libre trdila, da jo je vodja varnostne službe lokalne bolnišnice ustrašil in jo prisilil, da je izbrisala fotografije bolnikov, s katerimi je opravila razgovore, kljub dejstvu, da je imela dovoljenje pacientov fotografije.


TWE se spominja: Boj zaradi pogodb o Panamskem kanalu

Predsednik Obama se s potovanjem v Latinsko Ameriko prične 19. marca. Ko se ustavi v Braziliji, Čilu in Salvadorju, bodo uradni posli segali od trgovine do energije do regionalne varnosti. Eno vprašanje, ki ne bo na dnevnem redu, je Panamski prekop. To je zato, ker je na ta datum leta 1978 senat ozko sprejel "Pogodbo o trajni nevtralnosti in delovanju Panamskega kanala", s čimer je odstranil dolgotrajno dražilno stanje v odnosih ZDA z Latinsko Ameriko.

Območje Panamskega kanala, ki je prerezalo deset milj široko pot sredi Paname, je bilo od nastanka v Latinski Ameriki vir sporov. Theodore Roosevelt se je sprva pogajal s pogodbo s Kolumbijo o izgradnji kanala čez Panamsko ožino. Kolumbijski senat je pogodbo zavrnil, ker je bil na eni strani v prid ZDA. TR, ki se je odločil, da obstaja več načinov, kako odtrgati mačko, je k uporu spodbudil panamske separatiste, ki so se želeli osvoboditi oblasti iz Bogote. Ko je upornikom uspelo, deloma zato, ker je ameriška mornarica preprečila, da bi kolumbijske čete pristale v Panami, da bi zadušile vstajo, se je TR z novo vlado dogovoril za izgradnjo kanala.

Panamski prekop je bil za ZDA velik ponos, vendar so se začele težave. Leta 1964 so v Panami izbruhnili protiameriški nemiri, v katerih je umrlo triindvajset Panamcev in trije Američani. The violence was ostensibly triggered by reports that U.S. high school students in the Canal Zone had desecrated a Panamanian flag. But the deeper issue was that many Panamanians saw U.S. control of the canal as an affront to Panamanian sovereignty—“a foreign flag piercing its own heart,” as a later Panamanian leader, General Omar Torrijos, would put it.

James M. Lindsay analyzes the politics shaping U.S. foreign policy and the sustainability of American power. 2-4 times weekly.

The Johnson administration and then the Nixon administration talked with Panama about writing a new treaty. But those negotiations had failed to produce an agreement by the time Jimmy Carter came to office in 1977. So it fell to Carter to strike a final deal. Although he had argued against giving control of the canal to Panama earlier in his career, he had come to the conclusion that the canal was no longer vital to U.S. strategic and trade interests and that a failure reach an agreement with Panama would jeopardize America’s political and economic relations with all of Latin America.

Carter moved quickly. In August 1977, U.S. and Panamanians announced an agreement. The deal they struck consisted of two treaties. One, which is sometimes called the “Panama Canal Treaty,” terminated the original 1903 treaty and established a process for handing complete control over the canal to Panama by December 31, 1999. The other treaty, usually referred to as the “Neutrality Treaty,” gave the United States a right in perpetuity to protect the canal’s “neutrality,” that is, to ensure that any and all countries could use it.

Latin America hands praised Carter for resolving a budding crisis in the region. Unfortunately for the man from Plains, Georgia, Latin America hands were not nearly as numerous or as vocal as the conservative, pro-canal lobby in the United States. They hated the deal. Coming as it did on the heels of the ignominious U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, they charged Carter with appeasement and assailed America’s “retreat” from the world.

A leading voice for the anti-treaty forces was Republican presidential hopeful Ronald Reagan. For the Gipper, the Canal Zone was “sovereign United States territory just the same as Alaska. . . and the states that were carved out of the Louisiana Purchase.” Or as he liked to say in a line in his stump speech that brought his conservative audience to its feet: “We bought it, we paid for it, it’s ours, and we’re going to keep it.” Reagan’s fellow California Republican, Sen. S. I. Hayakawa, had a slightly different take—America had a right to the canal because “we stole it fair and square.”

As a matter of law and history, Reagan and Hayakawa had it wrong. The Canal Zone was not sovereign U.S. territory, whether taken fairly or unfairly. As Ellsworth Bunker, the distinguished U.S. diplomat who helped to negotiate the treaty, argued:

We bought Louisiana we bought Alaska. In Panama, we bought not territory, but rights . . . . It is clear that under law we do not have sovereignty in Panama.

Whatever the facts, much of the public sided firmly with Reagan and Hayakawa. A poll taken in September 1977 found that only 23 percent of Americans supported the treaties, while 50 percent opposed them. The breadth and depth of opposition to the treaties unnerved some senators, perhaps none more so than Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.) He told Carter that while he was personally inclined to support the treaties, most of his fellow Nebraskans weren’t. Caught between his own policy preferences and those of his constituents, he announced that he would vote for the treaties if the administration could persuade a majority of Nebraskans that it was the right thing to do.

Worried about where public opinion would lead Senator Zorinksy and others, Carter set out to make the case for the treaties to the public. He gave a major presidential address on the importance of approving them. The Committee of Americans for the Canal Treaties, composed of Cold War luminaries, influential labor leaders, and other opinion shapers, was formed to support passage. Major corporations that worried about what would happen to their investments in Latin America if the treaties didn’t pass, as well as liberal religious groups seeking to wipe away the stain of “colonialism,” also joined the fray.

Carter also got a surprising boost from an unlikely source in Hollywood—Marion Robert Morrison. Better known to the world as John Wayne—yes, that John Wayne, the star of Stagecoach, The Searchers, The Green Berets, and True Grit, among other classic films—he had become friends with the Panamanian leader, General Torrijos. And he didn’t take kindly to Reagan criticizing his friend. He publicly challenged the Gipper “point by God damn point in the Treaty where you are misinforming people.”

Carter’s team at times took a page out the John Wayne macho handbook in defending the treaties. When Carter’s national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was asked how the United States would respond if Panama closed the canal on the pretext of conducting repairs, his response was blunt (and not well-received in Panama City): “According to the provisions of the Neutrality Treaty, we will move in and close down the Panamanian government for repairs.”

The debate came to a head in March 1978. Here Carter was helped by Senator Minority Leader Howard Baker. (Chalk one up for bipartisanship.) As the historian George Herring tells the story:

The key to the administration’s eventual narrow victory was the passage of two amendments [to the Neutrality Treaty] carefully crafted and shepherded through the upper house by Democrat Robert Byrd of West Virginia and Republican Howard Baker of Tennessee. The first gave the United States explicit rights after the year 2000 to intervene militarily to keep the canal open and for U.S. ships to move to the head of the line in times of crisis. Originally a memorandum of understanding, this amendment was formally incorporated into the treaty after quite extraordinary negotiations between Senator Baker and Torrijos.

On March 16, the Senate voted to approve the Neutrality Treaty by a margin of sixty-eight to thirty-two, just one vote more than the two-thirds majority needed. (Polls showed that Nebraskans opposed the treaty. Senator Zorinksky kept his word and voted no.) Along the way, the Senate rejected seventy-seven amendments, most of which were designed to make the treaty unacceptable to Panama. A month later the Senate passed the Panama Canal Treaty, and the process of handing control of the Panama Canal over to Panama was set in motion.

The battle over the Panama Canal treaties illustrates two broader lessons about the politics of American foreign policy. One is that presidents at times have won over the Senate even when they failed to win over the American public. Polls taken in the spring of 1978 showed that support for (30 percent) and opposition to (53 percent) the treaties had not budged since the previous summer, despite Carter’s full-court press on the public relations front. (I said in yesterday’s post that today’s TWE Remembers would provide an example of how presidents can move public opinion. Scratch that.) An interesting question to ponder is whether a president today could get the Senate to approve any treaty that a substantial portion of the public opposed. Polls showed substantial support for the New Start Treaty, and it still almost landed on the ash heap of history.

The other lesson is that prevailing on Capitol Hill does not mean that a president necessarily prevails politically. Carter later lamented that “some fine members of Congress had to pay with their political careers for their votes” on the canal treaties. But in many ways he did as well. He may have done the right thing in settling the Panama Canal issue—and the fact that we virtually never talk about the canal suggests he did—but he reaped few political benefits from his victory and more likely hardened the convictions of his opponents to unseat him in 1980.

Postscript. Carter’s problems with the Panama Canal did not end with Senate passage of the treaties. He also had to persuade Congress to appropriate funds to carry out the treaties’ provisions. This gave members of the House an opportunity to vent their spleen over the fact that the Constitution does not give them a role in treaty-making. Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.) castigated a round of Carter administration officials sent up to Capitol Hill to defend the request for the funds:

We in the House are tired of you people in the State Department going to your tea-sipping friends in the Senate. Now you good folks come up here and say you need legislation [to implement the treaties] after you ignored the House. If you expect me to vote for this travesty, you’re sorely in error.

When the conference committee set up to reconcile differences between the House and Senate versions of the implementing legislation issued its first report on the bill, the House rejected it. The House reversed itself only after Carter launched an intensive lobbying effort that involved former secretary of state Henry Kissinger and other Republican notables. Perhaps it is not surprising that most administrations wish they didn’t have to deal with the Hill.


Politično življenje

Vlada. The republic is a constitutional democracy. Panama inherited from Colombia a binary system of liberals versus conservatives, both of which agreed on opposition to the presence of the United States in the Canal Zone. In 1940, these were eclipsed by a nationalist movement led by Arnulfo Arias, who employed fascist rhetoric and methods and was deposed during World War II. Elected again decades later, Arias was deposed again. Omar Torrijos, a military leader, instituted a corporatist, welfare-oriented state with a new constitution that declared him as head of government above a subservient president and cabinet. Although there was a legislative assembly and local councils throughout the republic, the regime was largely a command structure. It borrowed funds from abroad to build an infrastructure, including electrification and education, and united the public behind its effort to gain control of the canal. Torrijos died in a plane crash in 1981, and shortly after his death the military leader Manuel Noriega took over the civil government. After refusing to recognize the results of the 1989 elections, Noriega had the legislature declare him president. Five days later, the United States invaded to protect the Canal, restore democracy, and eventually arrest Noriega for drug trafficking.

Vodstveni in politični uradniki. In the aftermath of the invasion, the Defense Forces were abolished, and Panama has come to have a lively and openly debated political life. Political leaders include members of the old elite. Most persons in public life tend to be middle class, of urban or interiorano origin.

Socialni problemi in nadzor. Crime is scarce outside of certain slums in Panama City and Colon, where robberies are common. International drug smuggling is a problem in jungle areas near the border with Colombia. Drug cartels, however, are not reputed to maintain bases within the republic. Panama has never had a leftist guerrilla movement. All the regimes have been able to contain social tensions without endemic violence.

Vojaška dejavnost. The armed forces have become a police force with a limited defense role. Although the United States vacated its bases, it retains the right to defend the canal against an attack from any source.


Panama - Political rights index

Source: Freedom House. 1 - the highest degree of freedom.

What is Panama political rights index?

Datum Vrednost Change, %
2018 2.00 0.00%
2017 2.00 0.00%
2016 2.00 0.00%
2015 2.00 0.00%
2014 2.00 0.00%
2013 2.00 100.00%
2012 1.00 0.00%
2011 1.00 0.00%
2010 1.00 0.00%
2009 1.00 0.00%
2008 1.00 0.00%
2007 1.00

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  • OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Panama
  • FORM OF GOVERNMENT: Constitutional democracy
  • CAPITAL: Panama City
  • POPULATION: 3,800,644
  • OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: Spanish, English
  • AREA: 29,118 square miles (75,416 square kilometers)
  • MONEY: Balboa, U.S. dollar

GEOGRAPHY

This Central American country is bordered by Costa Rica and Colombia, and is situated between the Caribbean Sea and the North Pacific Ocean. Panama is a narrow land bridge, or isthmus, connecting North and South America. Panama is slightly smaller than South Carolina.

Map created by National Geographic Maps

PEOPLE & CULTURE

Most Panamanians are descended from indigenous, or native, people, Europeans, Afro-Caribbeans, and immigrants from all over the world.

The three largest indigenous groups in Panama are the Kunas, Emberás, and Ngöbe-Buglés and they still live in the remote areas of the country.

They have their own dialects, languages, and customs and most of them also speak Spanish.

The national traditional dress for women is a long, full white cotton dress decorated with colorful embroidery called a pollera. Men wear a traditional montuno, which is a white cotton shirt with embroidery and short pants.

Family is very important in Panama. Children attend school from ages 7 to 15. Most of Panama’s national holidays are religious occasions.

Panamanians eat rice with most of their meals. They also eat corn tortillas with meat and vegetables.

NATURE

The country is very diverse with mountains, rain forests, beautiful white-sand beaches, and 1,500 islands. Darién Gap, from Panama City to Colombia, has about 12 million acres of rain forest, yet few Panamanians or tourists ever visit the area, which is only accessible by boat.

This remote nature preserve is threatened by development and the proposed extension of the Pan-American Highway through this region.

The national flower is a white orchid called the Flor del Espiritu Santo, or Flower of the Holy Spirit. There are over 1,400 tree species, including the square tree, which has a square shaped trunk and is found in the mountains west of Panama City.

Panama is home to many unique animals that are found only in Panama. The mysterious golden frogs have gleaming, shimmering skin and are thought to bring people good luck. The numbers of golden frogs is declining and so are the numbers of sea turtles.

GOVERNMENT & ECONOMY

Under the constitution, there are three branches of government, including the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Panamanians elect a president and a vice president every five years. The president picks a cabinet of ministers.

After years of government corruption, Panama instituted many laws to focus on human rights, and to make the government more transparent to its citizens.

Panama’s agricultural products are bananas, rice, corn, beans, and coffee.

ZGODOVINA

Explored and settled by the Spanish in the 16th century, Panama broke with Spain in 1821 and joined with Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela to form the Republic of Gran Colombia. When this republic dissolved in 1830, Panama remained part of Colombia.

With U.S. backing, Panama split from Colombia in 1903 and signed a treaty, which allowed the U.S. to control a strip of land on either side of a new canal.

The Panama Canal, built by the United States after Panama's independence from Colombia in 1903, joins the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The canal was built by 75,000 workers between 1904 and 1914 and allows boats to sail between the two oceans without having to go all the way around the South American continent.


Carter and Human Rights, 1977–1981

Jimmy Carter campaigned for the presidency in 1976 promising substantial changes in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. He intended to infuse a new morality in American diplomacy, one grounded in the pursuit of human rights.Carter made this cause explicit in his January 20, 1977, inaugural address: “Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights.” The Carter administration thus articulated, devised, and implemented a human rights strategy that would serve as the cornerstone of Carter’s foreign policy.

Criticism of human rights abuses in other nations served as an early indication that Carter’s inaugural address marked an ideological shift in U.S. foreign policy. During the early weeks of the administration, officials spoke out against harassment and human rights violations in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Uganda.When asked at a January 31, 1977, press conference if the administration would continue to address specific human rights issues or exert quiet diplomatic pressure, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance explained that the United States “will speak frankly about injustice, both at home and abroad,” while avoiding strident and polemical language. Vance cautioned, though, that the administration would not “comment on each and every issue” but would comment “when we see a threat to human rights” and when it was “constructive to do so.” The administration also linked human rights concerns directly to the conduct of foreign policy, including support for a bill halting importation of Rhodesian chrome and the reduction of foreign aid to other nations that did not display sufficient respect for human rights.

Carter further defined these efforts in a series of public addresses delivered in early 1977. These speeches also afforded Carter the opportunity to explain why and how his administration promoted human rights. Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on March 17, 1977, the President asserted that the United States had a “historical birthright” to be associated with human rights. While the United States had not always lived up to this ideal, Carter identified several steps to rectify U.S. shortcomings “quickly and openly,” including the liberalization of travel policies and the signing and ratification of international human rights covenants. In his May 22, 1977, commencement address, delivered at Notre Dame University, Carter drew a distinction between his policy and the policies of his predecessors, noting that they had pursued the “flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries.” As a result, the United States had moved away from its core values. The interdependent world of the 1970s required a “new American foreign policy” grounded in cardinal principles, including the “commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy.” The Notre Dame address served as a comprehensive statement and justification of Carter’s human rights policy.

Vance refined the policy in an April 30, 1977, address at the University of Georgia Law School. He promoted adherence to three human rights categories—the right to be free from government violation of the integrity of the person the right to fulfill vital needs such as food, shelter, and education and civil and political rights. Vance explained flexibility characterized implementation of policy, depending on the details of particular cases. The United States had to accept limits in pursuing human rights a rigid approach to imposing U.S. values on other nations would not allow the United States to achieve its objectives in this area.

These public declarations coincided with and guided the administration’s effort to translate Carter’s commitment into a broader strategy. In May 1977, the administration issued Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 28, which directed a review of U.S. human rights policy in order to define policy objectives, evaluate actions designed to improve rights, review national security considerations, and propose implementing actions. The completed PRM/NSC 28 study’s recommendations formed the basis for Presidential Directive 30, issued in February 1978. Noting that a major objective of U.S. foreign policy should be the observance of global human rights, Presidential Directive 30 outlined specific guidelines for U.S. human rights policy and indicated the types of rights the United States would protect. The United States would use “the full range of diplomatic tools,” including public statements, consultations with allies, and cooperation with non-governmental actors and international organizations. The directive linked economic and military assistance to the human rights records of the recipients countries with good or improving records would receive favorable consideration, while those nations with poor or deteriorating records would not. Presidential Directive 30 thus formally defined U.S. policy on human rights.

Implementing the administration’s human rights strategy required the Department of State to modify existing institutional structures. Legislation enacted during the Gerald R. Ford administration created the position of Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, located within the Deputy Secretary of State’s office. The Office of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs also included a Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and coordinators for Refugee and Migration Affairs and POW/MIA Affairs.Carter selected Patricia Murphy Derian, a civil rights activist, to serve as Coordinator, upon the retirement of Coordinator James Wilson. By the end of 1977, the Department of State established the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and elevated Derian to Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Foreign Service officers with regional and topical expertise staffed the Bureau, which, over time, added additional offices for country reports, asylum, and refugee and migration affairs. Managing the human rights country reports process existed as one of the main responsibilities of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. These reports on the status of human rights practices were initially limited to countries receiving security and economic assistance but later extended to apply to all countries. The Department of State released the annual reports to the public, and Derian testified before Congress concerning the administration’s views of the human rights record of particular countries.

Managing human rights policy also required the administration to establish new coordinating and evaluation mechanisms. To ensure that all bureaus engaged on human rights issues, Vance tasked Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher with creating a Human Rights Coordinating Group (HRCG), consisting of Department of State officials at the deputy assistant secretary level, to serve as an “internal mechanism” for decision-making. Recognizing that the United States could not examine economic and security assistance decisions in a vacuum, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski directed Vance and Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal to establish a group—the Interagency Working Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance—to evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, bilateral and multilateral aid decisions as they related to human rights and to provide guidance to ensure a unified government position on aid decisions. Brzezinski had also established within the National Security Council (NSC) a Global Issues Cluster responsible for overseeing issues such as human rights and arms control.


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